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Swigert: Some Problems of Dower in Florida

SOME PROBLEMS OF DOWER IN FLORIDA
WILLIAM

T.

SWIGERT*

The purposes of this article are twofold. First, in order to acquaint
the reader with certain basic principles of the law of dower, a brief
summary of Florida statutory and case law is presented. The primary
emphasis of this discussion, however, is confined to two areas: (1) the
actual admeasurement or allotment of dower; and (2) the law applicable to specific performance of land contracts and dower rights.
The effect of dower on estate taxes is excluded from this article.
Briefly, dower has been defined as that portion of the decedent
husband's estate allotted to the widow for her support and the support of her children.' The purpose of dower is to provide an assured
2
means of support for the widow after the death of her husband.
The widow's dower right is not derived through the husband or from
the contract of marriage 3 but from operation of law. 4 Although of
common law origin, dower in Florida is entirely a creature of statutes, 5
and the right to dower and the manner in taking is governed wholly
by probate law.
As provided by Florida Statutes, 6 a widow may elect to take, as
dower, a one-third part in fee simple of the real estate owned by her
husband at the time of his death, or which he had before conveyed
and as to which she had not relinquished her rights as provided by
law. In addition, a widow is entitled to a one-third part absolute of
the personal property owned by her husband at his death.7 Personal
property that is the subject matter of an inter vivos transfer or gift
by the husband is exempt from dower,8 notwithstanding the fact that
the wife does not consent or join in such transfer or gift.9
Before the husband's death, the wife has only an inchoate right
in dowable lands, which may become a consummate right upon his

0 B.S. 1958, Florida State University; LL.B. 1961, University of Florida; Member of Ocala, Florida, Bar.
1. Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751 (1947).
2. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1963) (dower free of all debts of decedent and expenses
of administration).
3. Catlett v. Chestnut, 100 Fla. 1146, 131 So. 120 (1930); Smith v. Hines, 10
Fla. 258 (1868).
4. Ibid. But see Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (28 Wall.) 137 (1874).
5. Bennett v. Bennett, 157 Fla. 627, 26 So. 2d 650 (1946).
6. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1963).
7. Ibid. See also Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So. 2d 158 (1944).
8. In re Brock's Estate, 63 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1953).
9. But see 31 FLA. B.J. 345 (1957) for the view that dower attaches to personalty pledged or mortgaged by the owner-husband without the joinder of his

wife.
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Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 3

1964]

SOME PROBLEMS OF DOWER

death.1 The inchoate right of dower is not an estate, title, or interest
in land, and confers no right of possession or control of the land to
which it attaches.": It attaches to the land immediately upon the
occurrence of marriage and ownership and from that time is considered to be an encumbrance within the covenant against encum-

brances.12
Upon the death of the husband, the widow's dower right in her
husband's realty becomes consummate or absolute.13 Prior to the
election by the widow to have dower assigned, however, the widow's
dower right is a mere right of action.14 Before assignment, the widow
has no right of entry upon the real property or right to possession or
enjoyment of any other property in which dower may be assigned.' 5
BAR, RELEASE, OR FORFEITURE OF DOWER

It is well established that a widow can be deprived of her right
to dower only by her voluntary consent, by her own act, or by the
provisions of law. Her right to dower may be barred as to a particular property only, or as to all property owned by her husband.16
Joinder by the wife in a deed or in the execution of a mortgage of real
estate are examples of the former; 1' whereas, examples of the latter
include divorce,:' a fair and just antenuptial' 9 or postnuptial 29 agree21
ment, and the failure to elect to take dower.
The most common methods utilized to effectuate the release of
dower rights in Florida are: (1) joinder of the wife in the husband's
deed of real estate, 22 and (2) the execution of a separate instrument
in which the wife releases her inchoate interest.23 A release obtained
through a valid power of attorney given by the wife will also release
10.
Corp.,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950); Gore v. General Properties
149 Fla. 690, 6 So. 2d 837 (1942).
Neal v. McMullian, 98 Fla. 549, 124 So. 29 (1929).
See Gore v. General Properties Corp., supra note 10.
Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751 (1947).
Mullan v. Bank of Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931).
Ibid.

16. See 11 FLA. JuR. Dower §11 (1957).
17. See FLA. STAT. §693.02 (1963). Cf. Haskins, Dower in Mortgaged Property,
5 MIAMI L.Q. 187 (1951).

18. Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751 (1947); North v. Ringling,
149 Fla. 739, 7 So. 2d 476 (1940).
19. In re Knight's Estate, 155 Fla. 869, 22 So. 2d 249 (1949).
20. Homey v. Rhea, 152 Fla. 817, 12 So. 2d 302 (1943).
21. See FLA. STAT. §731.35 (1963). The widow is required to make an election
as to dower within nine months from the date of first publication of notice to
creditors.
22. FA. STAT. § §689.03, 693.02 (1963).
23. FLA. STAT. §693.02 (1963).
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her dower rights to the property involved.2 4 It should also be noted
that, since 1943, an acknowledgment by a married woman is not necessary to constitute a valid execution of a deed or other instrument that
25
In order for the
releases her dower rights in the subject property.
be acknowlmust
it
however,
instrument to be entitled to record,
26
of
relinquishment
the
for
made
Statutory provision is also
edged.
27
minor.
married
a
by
dower
In addition to release, dower may be barred in a number of other
ways. A valid divorce will bar dower since the right only becomes consummate to the widow of a deceased husband, and a divorced wife cannot be a widow.2 8 Moreover, under the common law, a wife that
willingly left her husband and committed adultery was barred from
29
dower in her husband's lands even in the absence of a formal divorce.
20
This rule is apparently not in effect in Florida. Although a minority
view, 3 the Florida Supreme Court has also held that a sheriff's sale
extinguishes the wife's
pursuant to an execution against the husband
2
sold.
is
that
property
the
in
right to dower
The above list does not purport to be and is by no means exhaustive of the circumstances that may bar the dower right of the
widow in her husband's estate. 3
PRIORITIES

In most instances, dower in Florida is free from the liability of
the decedent's debts and all costs, charges, and expenses of administration 2 4 It is, however, ratably liable with the remainder of the

24. FLA.
25. FLA.

STAT.

§693.14 (1963).

§693.03 (1963).
26. FLA. STAT. §693.03 (1963).
27. FLA. STAT. §693.04 (1963).
28. Busch v. Busch, 68 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1953); North v. Ringling, 149 Fla. 739,
7 So. 2d 476 (1940).
29. See Statute of Westminstcr, 1285, 13 Edw. I c. 34.
30. See Wax v. Wilson, 101 So. 2d 54 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
31. See 28 C.J.S. Dower §40 (1941).
32. In re Hester's Estate, 158 Fla. 170, 28 So. 2d 164 (1946). But see Roan v.
Holmes, 32 Fla. 295, 13 So. 339 (1893).
33. See 1 REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA §252
(3d ed. 1957); Dowling, Dower in Florida, 31 FLA. B.J. 345 (1957) (where the
authors list at least fifteen ways to bar dower rights).
34. There has been much confusion in the Florida cases on the question of
priority between the widow's dower rights and the security interests of creditors
in decedent's personal property. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170
So. 856 (1936); Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936); Rubin v.
Rubin, 144 So. 2d 527 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). The legislature amended §731.34 of
the Florida Statutes in 1963 in an attempt to clarify the situation. No attempt will
STAT.
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estate for the estate tax due when the dower has the effect of increasing the estate tax.35 Dower is superior to the right of a transferee of
real property from the husband, in the absence of a valid release by
the widow of her dower right.36 On the other hand, no dower rights
arise in personal property until the death of the husband, thus the
widow has no dower claim superior to the transferee of personal
property that has been sold or otherwise transferred by the husband
during his lifetime.37 Finally, a widow's dower claim is superior to
rights of the heirs, devisees, and legatees of the husband's estate.38
The abatement and contribution of legacies and devises as a consequence of a widow's election to take dower is discussed below.
ELEcrION To TAKE DOWER
The dower statute3 9 expressly provides that a widow, dissatisfied
with the portion of her husband's estate to which she is entitled under
the law of descent and distribution, or under her husband's will, or
both, (as in the case of partial intestacy) may elect to take dower.
The election must be in writing, signed by the widow, and acknowledged or sworn before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments or to administer oaths.40 The written election must be filed
within nine months after the first publication of the notice to creditors, in the office of the county judge in whose court the estate of the
deceased husband is being administered. The statute provides, 4' however, that if the county judge should extend the time in which
creditors may file their claims, or if dower is contested, or should litigation occur concerning the admission of the will to probate or as to
its validity or construction, the widow has sixty days from the extended time, or final judgment on each litigation, to file for dower.
The county judge is charged with the statutory duty to record all
42
elections to take dower.
In a case where the widow is suffering under a disability at the
time she is required to file her election, her guardian may file on her
be made to consider the problems arising in this area; however, the reader should
be alerted to the complex questions presented.
35. FLA. STAT. ch. 693 (1963), as discussed in text at notes 22-27 supra.
36. Blount v. Bost, 97 Fla. 449, 121 So. 472 (1929).
37. In re Payne's Estate, 83 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1955); FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1963).
38. See generally In re Malone's Estate, 54 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1951); Murphy v.
Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Catlett v, Chestnut, 100 Fla. 1146, 131
So. 120 (1930).
39. FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1963).
40. FLA. STAT. §731.35 (1) (1963).
41. FLA. STAT. §731.35 (2) (1963).

42.

FLA. STAT.

§731.35 (1) (1963).
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behalf at any time during which she might have done so. 43 Similarly,
if a widow dies prior to the expiration of the time allowed for the
filing of her election to take dower, and she has not yet filed, it may
be filed at any time within the statutory period by any person who
has a beneficial interest in her estate.4 4 In both of these instances,
that is, when someone other than the widow files, the election so
filed is subject to the approval of the county judge as the best interests
of the widow or the parties entitled to participate in the estate of
the deceased widow may require. 45
An election, whenever filed, takes effect as of the date of the
husband's death and makes inoperative the provisions of the husband's
will for the widow's benefit. As a general rule, under conflict of
laws, if an election is made in the state of the domiciliary administration of the husband's estate, the widow is bound thereby in all
states. 46 Thus, the election will have extraterritorial effect at least
to the extent that the widow, who is also a beneficiary under the will,
cannot assert a claim under it to land owned by her deceased husband
in other jurisdictions.
ASSIGNMENT OF DOWER

After the widow has exercised her election to take dower, it is
the duty of the personal representative to file the petition for assignment of dower in the county judge's court in which administration
of the decedent's estate is pending.47 Citation must be served upon the
widow, heirs, devisees, legatees, and distributees, or such of them that
do not appear and join in the proceedings. 48
In the event the personal representative fails to file a petition for
the assignment of dower, the widow, after she makes her election, may
herself file a petition. She must specify as particularly as may be
known to her the property in which she claims dower. If this latter
procedure is followed, citation must also be served in the same manner
as in the case when the personal representative files the petition. 4 9
In addition to the procedure outlined above, the widow may file
an extraordinary petition or petitions for assignment of dower in the
county judge's court of any county or counties in Florida where any
43. FLA. STAT. §731.35 (1963).

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Griley v. Griley, 43 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1949). See also Murphy v. Murphy, 125
Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
47. FLA. STAT. §733.09 (1963). See generally I REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA §254 (3d ed. 1957).

48.
49.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§733.10 (1963).
§733.11 (1963). See

REDFEARN, Op.
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lands lie that her husband had before conveyed, but as to which she
had not relinquished her right of dower. If such a petition is filed,
citations must be served upon all persons adversely interested. Proceedings on an extraordinary petition must be, as nearly as possible,
similar to those for the ordinary assignment of dower. 50 Jurisdiction
to hear and to give judgment for the assignment of dower is vested,
as provided in the constitution-' and by the provisions of the probate
law, 52 in the county judge's court.
After a judgment for dower is made, the county judge must appoint three suitable persons, who are disinterested and not related
to the parties by consanguinity or affinity, to act as commissioners to
set off and allot the widow's dower.5 3 Provision is made, however,
that if the interested parties agree as to the commissioners, they may
serve irrespective of any relationship that they may have to the
estate.5 4 In practice it is to the interest of all parties, including the
widow, to agree as to the widow's dower interest in the decedent's
estate. In so doing, the expense of the commissioners, additional
attorneys' fees, and the extra time involved can be eliminated. Moreover, since the legal services rendered to the widow in connection
with her petition for assignment of dower benefit the widow and
deplete the estate, her attorneys' fees cannot be charged against the
estate.55
If the parties cannot amicably agree to a division of the dower
interest and the commissioners are appointed, the county judge,
after holding a hearing on the report of the commissioners, must
confirm, reject, or modify the allotment or assignment made by the
commissioners. When the final judgment of dower is issued, it vests
in the widow a fee simple estate in the lands and the absolute ownership of the personal property allotted to her as dower. If circumstances make it necessary, the widow is entitled to a writ of possession
to obtain her assigned share.5 6

50.

FLA. STAT.

51.

FLA. CONSr. art. V, §7 (3).

§733.11 (2) (1963).

52. FLA. STAT. §§733.11-.14 (1963) as interpreted in In re Gauze's Estate, 109
So. 2d 170 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Coleman v. Davis, 106 So. 2d 81 (1st D.C.A. Fla.

1958). But cf. In re Lawrence's Estate, 45 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1950) (determination of
title to real estate between the estate and third persons can only be made by the
circuit court).
53.

FLA. STAT.

§733.13 (1963).

54. Ibid.

55. In re Binkow's Estate, 120 So. 2d 15 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
56. FLA. STAT. §733.14 (1963).
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ACTUAL ADMEASUREMENT AND ALLOTMENT

This section discusses the problems that are involved in admeasuring and computing a widow's dower interest in realty after
a determination has been made that she is entitled to dower.
The proceedings upon the petition for assignment of dower are,
as prescribed by statute, informal and summary.5 7 In the actual
computation of the one-third interest, the statutory allowances made
for the immediate support of the family"S are not treated as advancements that reduce her portion, but are deducted from the corpus of
the estate from which the dower is calculated. 59 Inasmuch as only
the assets subject to probate are included in the computation of
dower (except for real property conveyed by the decedent without
the joinder of his wife), property passing by operation of law, such
as, property held by the decedent and his wife as tenants by the
entirety, life insurance proceeds, homestead property, and the like, are
not included.
Allotment by Metes and Bounds
The summary statutory proceedings for the assignment of dower,r°
which dispense with the common law method of assignment by the
heir or other freehold tenant, contemplate an allotment or admeasurement by metes and bounds in specie.61 Although the Florida position
is in accord with the general rule that dower should be assigned by
metes and bounds whenever it is practically possible to do so, it has
been held that it is not the intent of the general dower statute to
make such a method mandatory, when by reason of the nature or
character of the property it is impractical to utilize that method.62
Moreover, no provision of the probate law expressly requires that
the portion allotted to the widow be measured by metes and bounds. 63
Allotment in Separate Tracts
The common law rule is to the effect that if the widow is entitled
to dower in separate tracts of land, she should be allotted an amount
equal to a one-third fractional value out of each tract rather than
57.

FLA. STAT.

§733.12 (1963).

58. FLA. STAT. §733.20 (1963).
59. See In re Gilbert's Estate, 160 Fla. 528, 36 So. 2d 213 (1948) (the widow is
estopped from complaining of this method of computation).
60. FLA. STAT. §§733.09-.14 (1963).
61. Waldin v. Waldin, 98 Fla. 344, 123 So. 777 (1929).
62. See Coleman v. Davis, 120 So. 2d 56 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
63. Ibid.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 3

1964]

SOME PROBLEMS OF DOWER

assigning a single tract to her, equivalent in value to the aggregate
of her dower rights in all the tracts. 64 This rule is often referred to
as "assignment by the common right" or the rule of separate assignments. 65 Such a rule equitably distributes the burden, by assignment
of dower among all tracts of land, and is consonant with the theory
that land is unique in itself.
The prevailing view is that the rule of separate assignments is
also applicable to the class of cases where several tracts of land have
been alienated by the decedent husband without the relinquishment
of the widow's inchoate dower rights. 66 Therefore, the widow's dower
is assigned proportionately and equitably in the land of each alienee,
and not entirely in the land of one.67
The trend of the cases seems to indicate, however, that the rule
of separate assignments will not be followed where there are no interests of prior alienees involved and it is apparent that an equitable
assignment of dower may be made by allotting the widow's portion
8
out of one tract without adversely affecting the rights of other parties.6
In this connection, some cases have held that dower should, whenever possible, be assigned entirely out of a tract of land belonging to
the husband's estate even though land has been alienated by the
husband during coverture. 69 In these cases the courts have emphasized the fact that the husband's prior conveyances were with covenants of title and to assign dower in these tracts would ultimately
render the husband's estate liable under the warranties contained in
7
the covenants for the entire charge of the dower rights. 0
7
In Harmon v. Peery l the court, in a very comprehensive opinion,
cited the following reasons for deviating from the well established
72
common law rule of allotting one-third from each separate tract:
It is obvious from a review of the authorities that the ground
upon which equity departs from the common-law rule is to
prevent injustice to third parties, if this can be done without
64. See, e.g., Arbough v. West, 127 Ark. 98, 129 S.W. 171 (1917); Harmon v.
Peery, 145 Va. 579, 134 S.E. 701 (1926); Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 109 W. Va. 260, 153
S.E. 918 (1930). But cf. Lane v. Lane, 206 S.C. 491, 34 S.E.2d 754 (1945).
65. See 17A At. JuR. Dower §162 (1957).
66. See 28 C.J.S. Dower §99 (1941).

67. Ibid.
68.

17A Am. JUR. Dower §162 (1957).

69. See, e.g., 2 TIFFANY, REAL
§99 (1941).
70. See
Tenn. 150,
DoWER 638
71. 145
72. 145

PRoPERTY

§541 (3d ed. 1939); 28 C.J.S. Dower

Wood v. Keyes, 6 Paige 478 (N.Y. 1837); cf. Gillespie v. Jackson, 153
281 S.W. 929 (1926). See also C.J.S. Dower §97 (1941); 2 SCRIBNER,
(2d ed. 1883).
Va. 578, 134 S.E. 701 (1926).
Va. at 585, 134 S.E. at 703.
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injustice to the widow or to the decedent's estate. Practically
all, if not quite all, the cases, where the lands of an alienee,
subject to a widow's dower, have been exonerated, and the
burden put upon lands of which the husband died seized,
have been cases where the husband, during his lifetime, has
conveyed the lands so exonerated with general warranty, without the joinder of the wife in the deed. In such a case, the
heirs, because of the warranty, would have to make the warranty good, and, in order to prevent a circuity of actions,
equity puts the burden where it would ultimately fall; that
is, in addition to protecting the widow's rights, there must
be some obligation upon the estate to make good the title of
a purchaser before the heirs can be charged with and the
purchaser exonerated from dower.
Although the early Florida case of Milton v. Milton73 is cited for the
proposition that a widow entitled to dower in several tracts of land
may have her dower allotted in one tract that is equal in value to her
interest in the whole,7 4 no Florida decision has been found that
directly sustains the view that a widow may be required to take her
entire dower interest from land comprising the husband's estate at
death rather than reaching back and obtaining a portion from the
lands of her husband's prior grantees.75
The reasoning employed in the Harmon case seems to be eminently
sound. In the case where the husband has conveyed by warranty deed,
without the joinder of the wife, it would seem to be in the best interest of all parties involved to require the widow to take her
allotted share of dower entirely from the estate owned by the husband
at his death. The circuity of actions argument that arises from the
fact that the prior grantee would sue the estate for breach of warranty
if dower is allotted out of his tract of land is further supported in
Florida by the fact that no priority exists between real and personal
property in the payment of debts and expenses of the estate.76 Thus,
an heir or devisee of the decedent's property would have no standing
to object to this method on the ground that if the prior grantee
were to sue the estate for breach of warranty, the takers of the personal property would be exclusively liable for the exoneration of
73. 14 Fla. 369 (1874).
74. See II FLA. JUR. Dower §31, note 1 (1957).
75. Cf. Moore v. Price, 98 Fla. 276, 123 So. 768 (1929) (commissioners may
award as dower more than a fractional one-third interest in some portions of the
husband's estate and less in others); In re Ginsberg's Estate, 50 So. 2d 539 (Fla.
1951) (suggesting that under different facts dower may be allotted from personal
property only).
76. FLA. STAT. §734.05 (2) (1963). See also FLA. STAr. §734.06 (1963) (legacies
and devises abate without priority between real and personal property).
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the widow's dower interest. To adopt this method, and to apply it
in all cases where the husband-decedent has alienated real property
subject to dower rights, at least when the estate of the husband is
sufficient to sustain the entire charge of the one-third dower interest,
would lend security and promote certainty in real property transactions, and in addition, avoid the valuation problems77 that arise
when the alienated property has increased in value subsequent to the
conveyance.
The Florida Supreme Court in Johnson v. Hayes,7s although not
entirely on point with the present discussion, expressed a view judicially protecting the interests of prior grantees of the husband's
land under similar circumstances. There, after the husband's estate
had been closed, the widow filed an extraordinary petition for assignment of dower in the parcels of land that had been sold by her
husband in his lifetime. The court, in dismissing the petition upon
the motion of the defendant-grantees, stated that equity would estop
her from asserting the relief claimed because she had waited until the
estate had been closed, and as a result no claim could be filed against
it for breach of the warranty her late husband had made in purporting to convey a fee simple title as a single man. Of course, no
factors sufficient to constitute a valid estoppel argument would arise
against the widow from the act of filing a timely extraordinary petition for dower in the alienated lands. A plausible argument could
be made, however, that it would be inequitable, as to the grantees,
to allow the widow dower in their lands when the estate of the
husband itself is sufficient to sustain the entire burden of the widow's
interest. If the policy behind the dower statute is to provide an assured means of support for the widow and her family, what difference
could it make if her dower were allotted entirely out of one parcel
of the estate, assuming that the one-third value of the assignment were
not diminished?
It is submitted that it is proper and equitable for the court to set
a separate tract aside for the widow, instead of scattering the assignment over all the tracts, when such an assignment would not be
prejudicial to the other parties in interest.
Valuation for Assignment
The first step in the assignment of dower is the determination of
the value of the property subject to dower. At common law this was
ascertained by marking off one-third of the deceased husband's lands
77.

See text, subheading Valuation for Assignment, infra.

78. 52 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1951). See also ADKINS,
§51.03 (1959) (excellent discussion of cited case).
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and then setting it apart for the widow's use during her life.7 9 This
too has changed, and today the value of property is measured by its
productive capacity. 0 The widow is entitled to such property as
would produce the equivalent of one-third of the rents and profits
that all the husband's freehold property would produce81 As heretofore stated, however, dower in Florida is prescribed by statute, and
the widow's interest is one-third fee simple in lands and one-third
absolute interest in personalty owner by the husband at his death,
together with one-third interest in real estate conveyed by the husband
without joinder of his wife during his lifetime.
In computing the aggregate value of all the dowable land, the
general rule is that the property's value is computed as of the date
of assignment.8 2 Hence, the widow is entitled to any benefit accruing
from a general rise in the value of property in the neighborhood and
any increased value caused by other extraneous factors from the time
of the conveyance. 83 When the land has been substantially increased
in value through improvements by the person in possession, however,
a different rule is applied in computing the value of the dower
interest.
a. Improvements by a PurchaserFrom Husband
In the case where a purchaser from the husband makes valuable
improvements on the dowable lands, the rule is well established that
the value of the improvements will be excluded from computation of
the widow's interest84 The value of such improvements are deducted,
however, only to the extent that they actually enhance the value of
the land and not on the basis of their cost. 5
The rule denying the widow benefit of these improvements is
predicated on a policy of encouraging the making of improvements
"and [thereby] advanc[ing] the growth and settlement of the county."S6
On the other hand, it has been stated that the true reason for the
rule is that it would be inequitable to permit one person to reap
what another has innocently and rightfully sown.
The First District Court of Appeal, in Coleman v. Davis,8 7 a case
79. 17A Am.JUR. Dower §156 (1957).
80. Ibid.
81.

2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §541 (3d ed. 1939).
17A Am. JUR. Dower §161 (1957). See also 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note
81; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §5.46 (Casner ed. 1952).
83. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 81.
84. 2 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 81.

82.

85. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1168 (1931).
86. Gridley v. Wood, 334 Ill. 153, 155, 176 N.E. 356, 358 (1931).
87. 120 So. 2d 56 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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of first impression in the state on this subject, enunciated the Florida
88
view by stating in part:
The majority rule in the United States, and the one we hereby
adopt and follow, is that a widow's dower in real estate alienated by her husband without her consent, does not extend to
any improvements made thereon by her husband's alienee
or successors, but is limited to the real estate as it existed at the
time of alienation.
b. Improvements by an Heir or Devisee Before Assignment
When improvements are made by an heir or devisee of dowable
lands before assignment, a different rule is applied. Improvements
made by them are not excluded from the computation. When the
dower interest is assigned, it is based on the value of the land at the
time of the assignment.8 9 Therefore, the widow shares in the increased
or decreased value of the property occurring from improvements made
by the heir or devisee, from changes in the general land values of
the neighborhood, and from the heir's or devisee's neglect or waste
of the property in the interval between the husband's death and the
assignment. 90
The reason generally given for including the improvements made
by the heir or devisee in the computation, is that such persons proceed
at their peril since they have notice that they might be called upon to
assign the widow's interest. 9' This reason is not accepted as satisfactory by all courts and the distinction made between the improvements by an alienee and an heir or devisee has been criticized. 92 It is
argued that "to say that it is the heir's folly to make improvements
before he assigns is merely to beg the question, for his act is foolish
93
because the law penalizes him."
Abatement of Legacies and Devises
When the widow exercises her statutory right to waive the will,
she usually does so for the purpose of obtaining a pecuniary advantage.9 4 This means that the share of one or more of the legatees
88. Id. at 58.
89. See 17A AM. JuL Dower §161 (1957); 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 81, §1.
90. AMERicAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §5A6 (Casner ed. 1952). Contra, Manning
v. Laboree, 33 Me. 343 (1851); 2 TFANY, REAL PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 81.
But see 2 SCRMNER, DowER §598, note 5 (2d ed. 1883) (waste caused by heir).
91. Calter v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218 (1812).
92. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §5A6 (Casner ed. 1952).
93. Id. at 749.

94. See

LEACH, CASES ON THE LAw OF WiLis
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or devisees will be reduced. The question then arises as to who will
bear the loss that results when the widow elects against the provisions
made for her in the will?
The difficulty in stating a definitive answer to this question stems
from the fact that although the courts attempt to reach a soluion that
conforms with the probable intention of the testator in the necessary
readjustment, the will itself seldom indicates that the testator contemplated his spouse's renunciation, much less the procedure to be
followed in the event she does renounce. In the absence of testamentary guidance two different rules have been developed by judicial
decision in an attempt to effectuate an equitable readjustment.
The majority rule is to the effect that the bequests and devises- 5
will be abated in the same manner that property abates for the payment of debts.

96

Thus, the loss due to the election, absent a contrary

testamentary direction, must be borne first by the residuary beneficiaries, and only if their interest is insufficient will the general and
specific gifts be abatedY. The interest that the widow received under
the will, renounced when she elects dower, is then taken and used to
reimburse or compensate the legatees and devisees whose interests
were abated.98
The Florida rule as to abatement is in substantial accord with
the majority rule. 99 The Florida probate law incorporates by statute
most of the principles followed by the jurisdictions that adopt the
majority view. Florida Statutes, section 734.06, provides, in part: 100
Whenever the assets of a testate estate are insufficient for the
full payment of debts, estate and inheritance taxes, family
allowance, charges and expenses of administration, devises and
legacies, and when the will directs or discloses an intention as to
the order of abatement, effect shall be given to such directions
or intentions. Unless such directions are given or such intention appears, residuary legacies and devises shall first abate; general legacies and devises shall next abate, and specific and
demonstrative legacies and devises shall abate last. Demonstrative legacies shall be classed as general legacies, upon the
failure or insufficiency of fund or property out of which payment should be made, to the extent of such insufficiency. Leg95.

ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS

§33 (2d ed. 1953) (devises should abate inter se

in same order as legacies).
96. Ibid.
97. ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 95; accord, FLA. STAT. §734.06 (1963).
98. ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 95.
99. See Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Dowling, Dower
in Florida,31 FLA. B.J. 345, 354 (1958).
100. FLA. STAT. §734.06 (1963) (Abatement and Contribution).
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acies or devises to decedent's widow given in satisfaction of
or in lieu of her dower or statutory rights in the estate shall
not abate until other legacies and devises of the same class are
exhausted. Legacies and devises given for a valuable consideration shall abate with other legacies of the same class only
to the extent of the excess thereof over the amount of value of
the consideration until all others of the same class are exhausted. Except as herein provided, legacies and devises shall
abate equally and ratably and without preference or priority
as between real and personal property. When property, real
or personal, which has been specifically devised or bequeathed
or charged with a legacy is sold or taken by the personal representative, other legatees or devisees shall contribute according
to their respective interests to the legatee or devisee whose
legacy or devise has been sold or taken . . ..
The minority view is illustrated by In re Byrnes Estate'0 ' in which
the court directed that the loss resulting from the widow's election
be borne by a pro rata abatement of all devises and bequests irrespective of their nature. This method of abatement, as opposed to having
the residuum first bear the loss, may well be argued to best approximate what the testator would have intended had he foreseen the
situation, especially when the residuary legatees and devisees are also
02
the natural objects of the testator's bounty.'
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DOWER RIGHTS

Perhaps the area of dower law that presents the most difficult
problems to a practicing attorney is that of inchoate dower. This
section is concerned with only one aspect of the inchoate dower concept - the legal principles involved when a contracting purchaser
seeks specific performance of a husband's contract to convey realty
and the wife refuses to join in such conveyance so as to release her
inchoate dower rights therein. The additional problems that arise
when the subject matter of the contract is homestead or separate
property of the wife are not discussed.103

1,01. 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y. Supp. 627 (Surr. Ct. 1939) (relying partly on
statute); accord, Bening v. Eischeid, 240 Iowa 1294, 39 N.W.2d 299 (1948); Povey
v. Povey, 271 Mich. 627, 261 N.W. 98 (1935).
102. For an excellent note elaborating this view see 47 HARV. L. Rav. 889 (1934).
103. For a discussion of these topics see 29 FLA. JUR. Specific Performance §49

(1961).
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Specific Performance With A batement of PurchasePrice
for Inchoate Dower Interest
The rule is generally recognized that a purchaser under a contract
for the sale of land is entitled to receive "good title"104 to the full
amount of land that he has contracted to purchase. He cannot be
compelled by the vendor to accept anything substantially less than
the terms of the contract provide, even if an abatement of the contract price is made. o5 On the other hand, if the vendor is unable to
fully comply with the terms of the contract because he lacks full legal
title to all the property sold, the vendee is entitled to a decree of
specific performance of the contract for as much of the property as
the vendor is able to convey either with or without an abatement of
the purchase price, depending upon the nature of the defect.1'°
The vendor, in such a case, is said to be estopped to assert his inability to completely perform pursuant to the terms of the contract. 0 7
Thus, although the vendee cannot have a partial interest forced upon
him by the vendor, he may require the vendor to give the best title
he can or to convey whatever property he has.108
The legal issues involved in the granting of specific performance
to a contracting purchaser when the defect in the vendor's title is the
existence of an unreleased inchoate right of dower have often been
the subject of litigation, and at least three different theories have
been advanced. These are: (1) the purchaser may demand specific
performance upon paying the full purchase price and compel the
husband to convey his title thus encumbered without any compensation or adjustment for the interest of the wife that is not conveyed; 09
(2) the purchaser may demand specific performance of the husband's
interest and may also deduct the estimated value of the wife's interest from the purchase price;1oi (3) the purchaser may demand
104. A good title within the meaning of this rule is "marketable title," i.e., one
that is free from any reasonable doubt, either in law or fact, as to its validity.
See 29 FLA. JUR. Specific Performance §71 (1960).
105. 29 FLA.JOR. Specific Performance §77 (1960). See also 49 AM. JLR. Specific
Performance §95 (1943); 22 FLA. LAW & PRACTICE Specific Performance §19 (1964).
106. Ibid; accord, PoarERoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE §434 (3d ed. 1926).
107. See Triplett v. Brevard Properties, 94 Fla. 869, 115 So. 534 (1927). But see
WALSH, EQUITY §76 (1930). Walsh takes the position that the doctrine of partial
performance with compensation is predicated on pure contract principles rather
than on estoppel.
108. See Brown v. Triffen, 75 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
109. See, e.g., Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329 (1946); Bohl v. Menger, 283 Pa. 508, 129 Atl. 459 (1925); In re Riesz's Appeal, 73 Pa. 485 (1873); Ford v.
Street, 129 Va. 437, 106 S.E. 379 (1921).
110. See, e.g., Brookings v. Cooper, 256 Mass. 121, 152 N.E. 243 (1926); Feldman
v. Siskansky, 239 N.Y. 81, 145 N.E. 746 (1924); Lewis v. Ludlam, 115 Misc. 347, 189
N.Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
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specific performance with abatement only upon paying the estimated
value of the dower interest into the court or by executing a bond to
indemnify the wife against loss, which would result if she should
survive her vendor-husband. 113
The second view is the probable weight of authority and is followed by the most recent decisions. 1 2 A few jurisdictions that follow
the third view place the burden of posting a bond on the vendor
instead of the purchaser. 113 There are also divergent views whether
the purchaser, if he retains an amount sufficient to indemnify the
4
wife, should be required to pay interest on the sum retained."
All three positions advanced contain elements that have been
the subject of criticism. None of the theories result in the purchaser
obtaining a clear title to the property conveyed. The majority rule,
that of allowing partial performance with an abatement of the purchase price, has been criticized on the additional grounds that: to
allow a reduction of the purchase price that the husband-vendor is
to receive under the contract is to indirectly induce him to coerce
his wife into joining in the conveyance; that by reducing the contract price the court is, in effect, substituting a new contract between
the parties, which the courts of equity repeatedly assert they will not
do; the estimated reduction for the dower interest cannot be accurately and fairly determined." 5
One writer has stated that the removal of the common law disabilities of married women,"16 and the fact that they are, in most respects, free actors, considerably diminish the validity of the coercion argument. He asserts that the most serious and cogent objection to the allowance of an abatement of the price is the practical
difficulty of fixing the value of the inchoate dower interest."17
The Restatement of Contracts"s prescribes a position that allows
the court the alternative of either an abatement in price measured by
the difference in value caused by the nonconveyance of the dower
111. See, e.g., Reed v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 58, 83 S.W.2d 554 (1935); Murray v.
Holcomb, 243 Ky. 287, 47 S.W.2d 1026 (1932); Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 203
S.C. 59, 26 S.E.2d 175 (1943).
112. See Inchoate Dower Today, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 679 (1948). See also
cases cited, note 110 supra.
113. See Luczak v. Mariove, 92 N.J.Eq. 377, 112 Ad. 737 (Ch. 1921); Stein v.
Francis, 91 N.J. Eq. 205, 109 Ad. 237 (Ch. 1919).
114. See Minge v. Green, 176 Ala. 343, 58 So. 381 (1912). See generally
McCLINTOCK, EQUrrY §67 (2d ed. 1948) (dealing with the various aspects of the

interest problem).
115.

For an excellent discussion of these and other criticisms, see 4 Wis. L.

REv. 362 (1928).
116.
117.

See FLA. STAT. §708.08 (1963).
4 WIs. L. REv. 362 (1928). See also MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 114.

118.

RFSTATEMENT, CoNT AcTs

§365, illus. 4 (1932).
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interest, or a requirement that the vendor provide sufficient indemnity against injury to the purchaser in the event the wife survives
her husband and enforces her rights.
The methods that are generally used in computing the amount
to be abated are discussed below.
Knowledge of MaritalStatus and Abatement
A number of jurisdictions that normally allow an abatement of
the purchase price for the wife's interest refuse to do so when the
purchaser had knowledge at the time the contract was executed that
the vendor was a married man. 119 Walsh, however, in his treatise
120
on Equity states:
The prevailing rule, based on sound reason, is that the purchaser may have specific performance with compensation,
though he knew when the contract was signed that the vendor
was married. There is no suggestion in such a case of any inequitable taking advantage of the vendor by the purchaser,
who has every right to believe that the vendor's wife will join
her husband in his conveyance in order to bar her dower,
the normal performance of such contracts. He is entitled to the
land to the extent that the vendor can convey, and justice
demands that he be protected against possible loss through
enforcement of dower, either by a deduction from the purchase
price of the present value of the inchoate dower, or in some
other way.
In support of the position expressed by Walsh, it has been suggested 12' that a rational approach to the matter of knowledge by the
purchaser of a defect in the vendor's title would be to distinguish the
exact effect of the kind of knowledge that the purchaser has in a
particular case. A purchaser having knowledge of an inchoate dower
right is in a quite different position from one who enters a contract
to purchase land with knowledge of defects that go to its permanent
character or condition. In the latter case a situation exists that cannot for all practical purposes be remedied. If the purchaser was

119. E.g., Fisher v. Miller, 92 Fla. 48, 109 So. 257 (1926) (estoppel); Peeler v.
Levy, 26 N.J. Eq. 330 (Ch. 1875); Farthing v. Rochelle, 131 N.C. 563, 43 S.E. 1
(1902); accord, POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE §461 (3d ed. 1926).
120. WALsH, EQUITY §76, at 392 (1930); accord, Brookings v. Cooper, 256 Mass.
121, 152 N.E. 243 (1926).
121. See Horack, Specific Performance and Dower Rights, 11 Iowa L. REV. 97,
103 (1926) (excellent discussion of arguments set forth in text).
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aware of these permanent defects it would be patently unfair to give
him compensation when he receives exactly what he expected to get
and what he knows cannot be changed. Indeed, in such a case he
would have no standing at law for breach of warranty, since he
cannot be considered to have relied in any way on the vendor's
promise to completely perform. Therefore, it would be inequitable to
allow compensation under the same circumstances in an equity suit
for specific performance.
The foregoing line of reasoning would not be applicable, however,
in the case in which the defect is the unreleased inchoate dower
right of the vendor's wife. This defect can be corrected. Under these
circumstances, it would seem fair to place the burden of correcting the
defect on the vendor, as the normal expectations of the parties are
that the wife will consent to the conveyance. If the wife subsequently refuses to release her dower, absent a clause in the contract
conditioning the vendor's performance on the wife's willingness to
join in the conveyance, the purchaser should be allowed specific
performance with an abatement, notwithstanding his knowledge that
the vendor was married.
It is provided by statute122 in Florida that coverture shall not
prevent a decree against a husband and wife, or either of them, to
specifically perform their written agreement to convey the separate
property of the wife or to relinquish her right of dower in the
property of the husband, even in the absence of an acknowledgment.
To constitute a valid release of the widow's dower rights in her husband's realty, however, the contract must be signed by her before
two subscribing witnesses. 123 Consequently, a purchaser seeking
specific performance of the vendor-husband's contract to convey
realty is not entitled to obtain a release of dower rights unless the
wife has joined in, or otherwise consented to, the conveyance. 24
In the case in which the contracting purchaser has no knowledge
of vendor's marital status at the time the contract to convey is executed, it seems to be well settled in Florida that specific performance
with an abatement from the purchase price equal to the estimated
value of the wife's dower interest will be granted. 25
122. FLA. STAT. §708.07 (1963). See also 29 FLA. JuR. Specific Performance §82
(1960).
123. See Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957); Abercrombie v.
Eldschum, 66 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1953); Williams v. Noel, 105 So. 2d 901 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1958).
124. Ibid. Van Fleet v. Lindgren, 107 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1958).
125. See, e.g., Van Fleet v. Lindgren, 107 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1958); Foxworth v.
Maddox, 103 Fla. 32, 137 So. 161 (1931); Fisher v. Miller, 92 Fla. 48, 109 So. 257
(1926) (dictum); Paradise Pools Inc. v. Genauer, 104 So. 2d 860 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1958) (specific performance of option to purchase realty).
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12
The Florida Supreme Court in Fisher v. Miller 6 stated the gen127
eral rule as follows:

The marriage status should not be used as a shield to prevent
the enforcement of a just obligation of a man who presents no
other excuse to justify his nonperformance. If in the further
proceedings in the case it should develop, as is indicated by
the plea, that the complainant or his assignor, was chargeable
with notice or knowledge of the defendant Miller's marital
status at or before the execution of the contract, all that the
complainant would then be entitled to secure would be specific
performance by said Miller

. .

. by conveyance to complainant

of such right, title and interest in the land as said Miller himself had ...

without any abatement of the purchase price. Or,

if it should develop that complainant was not chargeable with
such notice that Miller was married, he would be entitled to
like specific performance with an abatement from the purchase price of the present worth of the outstanding dower
interest.
As stated in the above opinion, the Florida rule is that knowledge that the vendor is married will prevent the purchaser from
in such a case is apparently
obtaining an abatement. 128 The purchaser
29
"estopped" to complain of the defect.1

Methods Employed in Computation of Dower Rights for
Purposes of A batement
No unanimity exists as to the method to be employed in ascertaining the amount that is to be abated from the purchase price for
the unreleased inchoate dower rights of the wife. The prevailing rule
is that the amount to be deducted is the value of the wife's inchoate
dower right at the time of conveyance, and not the difference between
the market value of the land with her release and the value without
it.1s3

At common law, where dower consists of a life estate in one-third
of the land, the method generally followed was to compute the present
126. 92 Fla. 48, 60, 109 So. 257, 261 (1926). See also Paradise Pools v. Genauer,
supra note 125 (reaffirming the quoted portion of the Fisher case).

127. 92 Fla. at 60, 109 So. at 261.
128.

Accord, PoMERoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANc E §461 (3d ed. 1926).

129. See Triplett v. Brevard Properties, 94 Fla. 869, 115 So. 534 (1927); Rose v.
Henderson, 63 Fla. 564, 590, 59 So. 138, 146 (1912). See also Fisher v. Miller, note
125 supra, where the court stated that if the vendee knew the vendor was married,
and failed to insist upon her signing the contract, he took the chance of her releasing her dower right and therefore is not entitled to abatement.
130. See 4 Wis. L. REv. 362, 367 (1928) (and cases cited).
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value of an annuity for the wife's life equivalent to the interest in
a third of the proceeds of the estate to which the contingent right
attaches. This figure is then reduced by an amount equal to the
present value of a similar annuity calculated upon the span of the
joint lives of husband and wife. The difference between these two
sums is said to be the present value of the widow's contingent dower
131
right.
In Florida, and in those jurisdictions in which the wife is entitled to a one-third fee simple interest in the lands of her husband,
the final value of the wife's interest, at least from the purchaser's
standpoint, is either one-third of the purchase price or nothing, as in
the case where the husband-vendor outlives the wife or in the event
of a subsequent divorce. Thus, there must be an inquiry as to the
prospective ages of the spouses, utilizing the mortality and actuarial
tables.13 2 Admittedly the life tables, as well as other mathematical
formulae, cannot predict with precise accuracy that the inchoate
interest will ever become consummate and, therefore, may lead to an
unfair determination in individual cases.
Because this method may produce arbitrary and oftentimes grossly
unfair results, one writer has suggested that the principle of indemnity
should be used exclusively. 33 Under this concept a part of the purchase price is retained as an indemnity contingent upon the vesting
of the inchoate right. The final determination of the various rights
of the parties is postponed until such time as the dower right becomes
vested. If the wife predeceases her husband, the exact terms of the
contract between the vendor and purchaser can then be carried out.
If, on the other hand, the wife survives her husband, the sum retained may be equitably distributed as the interests of the parties
demand. To fully protect the wife's potential rights, a larger sum
than is considered actually necessary at the time of conveyance may
be retained. The court is then free to redetermine the exact amount
to be abated at the time of assignment, when the contingency of
survivorship no longer exists.
No Florida cases were found actually determining the value of
the inchoate dower interest for purposes of abatement. The Florida
Court, however, in Fisher v. Mi~ler,34 decided before the statutory
change from common law dower to the present fee simple interest,
indicated its preference for the granting of an abatement, rather than

131. Ibid.
132.

See generally Horack, Specific Performance and Dower Rights, 11 IowA

L. REv. 97 (1926) (excellent discussion on subject of valuation).
133.

Ibid.

134. 92 Fla. 48, 109 So. 257 (1926).
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indemnity, by quoting with approval from Pomeroy's Specific Performance, which states, in part:135
Now by the aid of the life tables, disclosing the probable life
of the wife, the present value of her dower can be ascertained
with perfect ease upon the supposition that she will survive
her husband; and even if this should possibly be a little too
large, the husband, who has entered into a contract which he
cannot fulfill, is in no position to demand favor from the
Court.
The court further emphasized its preference for allowing an immediate abatement of the purchase price rather than employing the
indemnity principle by again quoting, with approval, from Pomeroy,
"This method, [indemnity] .. .is open to the criticism that it renders
the title exceedingly unmerchantable for an indefinite period."'136
It must be kept in mind that the doctrine of partial performance
with abatement is only an alternative remedy available to the contracting purchaser for defects in the vendor's title. He has, as an
additional remedy, an action at law for breach of contract. 137 Considering this, the hardships that often result to the purchaser in utilizing the various methods developed to preserve the wife's dower
interest when he seeks specific performance do not seem so inequitable. Indeed, he will only pursue this latter remedy when the
contract is clearly beneficial to himself. As to the vendor, if we were
to compare the deficiencies of the present methods employed with the
early English practice of ordering the husband to procure the signature of the wife or to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for contempt,"3s the hardships that are sometimes placed upon him would
also seem to fall well within the de minimus category.

135. 92 Fla. at 53, 109 So. at 261.
136. Id. at 60, 109 So. at 261. The court indicated that the difficulty in
determining the amount to be abated would be no obstacle to the granting of an
abatement, and if the purchaser were to sue at law, the damages would be assessed
upon exactly the same basis as the court of equity would employ on an abatement.
137. See Liberis v. Carmeris, 107 Fla. 352, 146 So. 220 (1933); Key v. Alexander,
91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883 (1926). In both of these cases it was decided that a vendor
who enters into a contract to convey land, failing to have his spouse join in the
contract and without revealing such failure to the vendee, will be looked upon
as entering such contract in bad faith. If the wife then refuses to join, the vendee
will be entitled to recover for the loss of his bargain.
138. See MCCLINTOCK, EQurry §67 (2d ed. 1948).
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be seen that although the general statutory
concepts of dower in Florida appear to be relatively simple, they
are most difficult and complex when applied to the recurring situations set forth in this article. Complicate the foregoing problem
with estate tax considerations and other problems relating to dower,
and we find ourselves in a difficult area of the law. Thus, it behooves
each general practitioner, property lawyer, and estate planner to
keep abreast with the ever-changing law on this subject.
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